



**National Targeting Centre  
High Risk Traveller Case Management Initiative  
Status Report: August 1-31, 2014**

## Purpose

To provide an update on National Targeting Centre (NTC) activities related to identifying Syrian Foreign Fighters.

### Scenario Based Targeting (SBT) rule development

The NTC is currently using scenarios that were developed by the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) scenarios relative to ongoing projects are currently under development.

### **Significant Examinations/Highlights/Results**

1

## Targeting Information Disclosures

The NTC Targeting Operations Intelligence (TOI) section received information disclosure requests for targeted secondary examination results. This information was provided and tracked in accordance with section 107 4(h) of the *Customs Act*.

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## Targeting Projects

### High Risk Traveller Case Management Initiative

The TO-I attended two High Risk Traveller Case Management Initiative (HRTCMI) meetings in August. Both meetings were held at the request of the RCMP.

The RCMP advised that the previously identified number of individuals of interest continues to grow on a frequent basis. The list has been amended to reflect individuals by their affiliated terrorism group (example: JN, ISIL, ISIS) and if they are abroad or have intention to travel abroad.

Intelligence was shared to the working group that injured individuals are travelling to the hospital in Antakya Turkey to seek medical attention. In addition to injuries sustained, the means by which these individuals were travelling to seek medical attention were also identified. These injured individual are using fraudulent identification and Syrian passports. The RCMP reported making progress with Turkish authorities in the sharing of information and their efforts to disrupt and identify these individuals. This information assisted the TO-I in development and refinement of scenarios as well as in providing shift briefings.

### HINT Syrian Data Exchange Exercise

The TO-I actively supported the HINT Syrian Data Exchange by providing:



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## **What is Scenario Based Targeting (SBT)?**

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## Sources for Scenario Development

- National Targeting Centre (NTC) - Targeting Operations Intelligence (TO-I)
- NTC - Targeting Officers
- International targeting centres
- Partner agencies
- CBSA Regional Intelligence Operations
- Border Services Officers and enforcement units.

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## **Development of Scenarios**

- Scenarios are developed based on |
- Significant interdictions also include our liaison officers overseas, and are referenced with International Bulletins, Ports of Entry seizures as well as Regional Intelligence Bulletins and other supporting documentation.
- Partner agencies provide actionable indicators and trends based on their areas of expertise, along with supporting documentation for the development of SBT, ensuring effectiveness and efficiency in the delivery of the integrated intelligence and enforcement for SBT.
- Once these items are in place, initial “volumetrics” are performed on the potential scenario.
  - Volumetrics: The projected measurement of a final product
- Creation of a single scenario often takes several days or even weeks to implement to ensure the scenario is relevant, supported and extensively researched.
- Scenarios can be implemented on short notice, in as little as 15 minutes.

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## **Monitoring the Scenarios**

- Targeting Programs - Traveller Targeting – Scenarios, Indicators and Reporting team (TTSIR) and TO-I work together to ensure the ongoing effectiveness of traveller targeting scenarios.
- TTSIR conducts ongoing monitoring of scenario effectiveness and performance.
- The NTC manually acquits all SBT targeting referrals on a daily basis, capturing indirect and direct results.
- TO-I monitors intelligence trends and patterns for changes that may reduce the effectiveness of a scenario and to identify possible new scenarios.
- Both teams conduct research to identify potential modifications of a scenarios, the deletion of ineffective scenarios and the creation of new scenarios.

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## **SBT & the 3 Tier System to Flight Risk Assessment**



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# Questions or Comments?





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# Introduction

- Scenario-based targeting (SBT) represents a major change in how the CBSA risk assesses travellers prior to their arrival in Canada.
- SBT leverages technology/automation, enforcement history, intelligence from various sources and best practices from partners.
- This presentation will:
  - Provide background on the targeting program and SBT
  - Explain what SBT is and how scenarios are developed
  - Explain the benefits and alignment with the US Customs and Border Protection (US CBP)
  - Describe implementation and ongoing activities
  - Discuss the way forward

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
# **What is Scenario-Based Targeting?**

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## Alignment with US CBP

- Canada and the US \ to identifying high-risk travellers.
- Ongoing communication/engagement with the US CBP on three levels:
  - Project development
  - Program development
  - Operations:
- Examples:
  - 
  - 
  - 
  - 
  - Coordinate security event response

## Border Five Countries - Activities



- Rule development
- Data analytics
- Rule exchange
- Syrian Foreign Fighter Initiative
- Targeting Working Group – joint projects
- Performance data sharing
- Video/tele-conference calls

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## Scenario Development Sources

- National Targeting Centre (NTC)
  - Targeting Operations – Intelligence (TO-I)
  - Targeting officers
- International targeting centres
- CBSA International Operations
- CBSA Intelligence and Enforcement Operations
- CBSA Border Services Officers
- Domestic and Internal Partners



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# **Scenario Development Process**




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## Scenario Measurement and Monitoring

- SBT target examinations captured on a daily basis
- SBT review rate and performance results reported on monthly, quarterly, and annual basis
- NTC - Targeting Operations Intelligence and the Traveller Targeting Scenarios, Indicators and Reporting Unit to conduct SBT rule performance review on a monthly basis:
  - Monitor program performance;
  - Create performance targets;
  - Identify possible improvements;
  - Identify new scenarios;
  - De-activate ineffective scenarios.


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## SBT Monitoring - Review Rate



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# SBT Performance Measurement Q1 - 2014



	Scenario-based targeting		Flight lists	
Targets issued				
National security results				
Contraband results				
Immigration results				
Total Results				

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# SBT Results

## National Security

- April 28, 2014
- Pierre-Elliott Trudeau Airport (YUL)
- created jointly by  
TO-I
- Referral and Quebec Regional  
Intelligence

Scenario Elements/Criteria	Traveller Details
----------------------------	-------------------

## National Security

- July 13, 2014
- Pearson Airport (YYZ)
- created jointly by  
TOI
- Referral RCMP, and CBSA  
Security Intelligence Section

Scenario Elements/Criteria	Traveller Details
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## SBT Results – con't

### Contraband

- December 11, 2013
- Pearson Airport (YYZ)
- 5.282 kg cocaine
- 
- 
- Scenarios created by TO-I

Scenario Elements/Criteria	Targeting API/PNR Indicators/Traveller Details
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### Immigration

- June 23, 2014
- Pierre-Elliott Trudeau Airport (YUL)
- 
- Suspected imposter using counterfeit  
Canadian visa
- Removal order issued

Scenario Elements/Criteria	Traveller Details

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## Way Forward

- Continue socialization of SBT concept
  - International Operations (Liaison Officer network)
  - Enforcement and Intelligence Operations
  - Ports of entry
  - Partners
- Expand data analytics capacity (access / tools / resources)
- B5 SBT rule exchange
- API / PNR data compliance
- R103 – 4<sup>th</sup> Quarter 2014-2015
- Refine SBT rule governance and performance measurement

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# **Questions or Comments?**



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## National Border Operations Centre

## High Risk Traveller Case Management Initiative

**Status Report Update: June 1 – 30, 2014**

### Scenario Based Targeting (SBT) rule development:

- The National Targeting Centre (NTC) Targeting Operations Intelligence (TOI) Section has developed **scenarios** these are currently active in the Passenger Information System (PAXIS). The scenarios were developed as a result of intelligence from national and international intelligence partners including Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and the United States Customs Border Protection (US CBP).
- These rules were analysed by TOI and **additional CBSA scenarios** were developed and modified and are currently awaiting migration into PAXIS following the e-fix on July 3, 2014.
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The additional rules were analysed by TOI and **one additional scenario** was created, for a total of **10 scenarios** awaiting migration following the e-fix on July 3, 2014.

### High Risk Traveller Case Management Initiative (HRTCMI)



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- The RCMP is currently drafting the Terms of Reference; once finalized a copy will be shared with senior management.
- The newly-appointed Liaison Officer (LO) from Turkey, Craig Bell, attended the HRTCM I working group meeting. The LO provided a debrief about his role and new responsibilities while in Istanbul. The working group was pleased to have the LO actively engaged and also be the pre-border point of contact to liaise with their Service and RCMP LO's in Turkey, as well as support the CBSA in the furthest traveller continuum (pre-departure). TOI is also supporting the LO by providing material that can be used for training Turkish airline/airport authorities in conducting examinations/questioning.

#### **Targeting Projects:**

#### **Enforcement and Intelligence Operations Directorate Update on the HRT File:**

The Heads of Intelligence (HINT) of the Border 5 agencies met in Australia the week of June 16, 2014, when they agreed to collaborate on the issue of HRT from a border management perspective. They agreed to share their respective risk rules and launch joint targeting operations based on each others' risk rules, experiences and best practices.

The classified intelligence assessment on HRT has already been provided. No updates since then have been issued.

The HRT meetings are hosted by the Department of National Defence (DND), but led by the Privy Council Office (PCO). DND hosts these meetings due to their technology and infrastructure capacity to permit video conferencing at the classified level.



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High Risk Traveller Case Management Initiative  
Status Report: July 1-31, 2014**

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**Scenario Based Targeting (SBT) rule development**

The NTC is currently using scenarios that were developed by the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) \ scenarios relative to ongoing projects are currently under development. I

Due to recent modification and amalgamation of scenarios, a change from (reported in June) to s now being reported.

**Significant Examinations/Highlights/Results**

There were four notable interceptions during the month of July.

- The NTC targeted a male Canadian citizen returning from Lebanon. Upon examination, the Border Services Officer (BSO) at Pierre Elliott Trudeau Airport in Montreal discovered Syrian contact phone numbers and copies of \$400K worth of money transfers conducted in Syria. The file has been referred and regional Enforcement and Intelligence (E&I).
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### **Targeting Information Disclosures**

The NTC Targeting Operations Intelligence (TOI) section information disclosure requests for targeted secondary examination results. This information was provided and tracked in accordance with section 107 4(h) of the *Customs Act*.

### **Targeting Projects**

### **High Risk Traveller Case Management Initiative**

On July 16, 2014, the NTC attended an urgent High Risk Traveller Case Management Initiative (HRTCMI) meeting called by the RCMP.

The RCMP finalized the Terms of Reference (TOR), outlining the HRT committee's guidelines that strengthen inter-agency cooperation to reduce the threat posed by Canadians travelling abroad for terrorist purposes. The TOR was reviewed by the NTC TOI and the Intelligence Operations Analysis Division and comments have been provided to the RCMP.

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### **Outreach**

On July 16 and 17, 2014, representatives from TOI visited the Prairie region, which has become a high-risk port of entry for returning Canadians and Canadian Permanent Residents who have travelled to Syria for extremist purposes. Outreach sessions at the Edmonton and Calgary International Airports were held. The sessions were presented to BSOs, Supervisors, Chiefs of Operations and E&I, the Director of Operations

### **Border Five Heads of Intelligence (HINT) Targeting Working Group (TWG)**

The Border Five HINT TWG met in Australia July 14-17, 2014. Representatives from the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship, CBSA, New Zealand Customs Service, United Kingdom Border Force and US Customs and Border Protection were present.

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Director General/ Directeur général Calvin Christiansen Tel. /Tél. :991-1773	<i>[Signature]</i> SEP 23 2014		
<b>Subject/Objet :</b> The Syrian Foreign Fighter Data Gathering and Analysis Exercise <b>Action/Mesure :</b> For information  The attached briefing note provides information on the results of the Canada Border Services Agency involvement in the Border Five Heads of Intelligence Targeting Working Group Syrian Foreign Fighter			

C.C. R. Wex  
P. Hill

Canada Border Services Agency  
Operations Branch, V.P.'s Office  
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Direction générale des opérations, Bureau du V.P.

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For information

## **HINT TARGETING WORKING GROUP – SYRIAN FOREIGN FIGHTER JOINT TARGETING OPERATION**

For the President

### **PURPOSE**

To provide you with information on the results of the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) involvement in the Border Five (B5) Heads of Intelligence (HINT) Targeting Working Group (TWG) Syrian Foreign Fighter Joint Targeting Operation.

### **BACKGROUND**

In July 2014, the B5 HINT TWG agreed to collaborate on The objective was to develop a collective view of B5 targeting efforts in the context of the Syrian civil war to compare approaches and inform and conduct future operations.

### **STATUS**

At the completion of the exercise,

(see attachment 1). Key findings are as follows:

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The CBSA National Targeting Centre Targeting Operations - Intelligence Section learned several key lessons for future initiatives:

1. A definition of the exact scenario-based targeting (SBT) rules to be exchanged must be agreed upon prior to project initiation;
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
5. What constitutes “derogatory information” in intelligence holdings, (e.g. lookout, target, previous target, customs enforcement action, immigration enforcement action, previous passage history, etc.) must be defined and documented;
6. The requirement to obtain written notification/confirmation of all record deletions from each B5 partner at the conclusion of this and subsequent projects must be established going forward; and,
- 7.

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The findings of this exercise confirmed that Canada was the only country that reported out in this manner.


## NEXT STEPS

On September 11, 2014, the B5 HINT TWG convened in Ottawa to review the findings of the Syrian Foreign Fighter exercise and to draft a new concept of operations, whereby each B5 partner would share hits on a twice-daily basis, conduct queries and provide derogatory information to HINT partners. Canada committed to support of the initiative in principle,

During the review period, scenario-based targeting rule development teams will review scenario-based rules to determine whether the rule sets will be refined or expanded.

Additionally, the intention of this exercise was not to have participating countries share the name hits with their respective security intelligence agencies. However, the CBSA is now in the process

Results of this process are pending.

 06 OCT. 2014  
Martin Bolduc, Vice-President  
Operations Branch

## ATTACHMENT

1. Border5 Heads of Intelligence (HINT) Syria Foreign Fighter





**CANADA BORDER SERVICES AGENCY**  
**NATIONAL TARGETING CENTRE**  
**FOREIGN FIGHTERS**

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### KEY MESSAGES:

- The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) is targeting and interdicting potential foreign fighters.
- Identified persons of risk are examined for prohibited, restricted or controlled goods, as defined by the Customs Act, Customs Tariff Act, ~~or~~ and Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) ~~or and Terrorist Finance Act.~~
- The CBSA is proactively working with Public Safety partners, recognizing that each has a role in mitigating this threat.

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**Current Status:**

The CBSA National Targeting Centre (NTC) conducts a pre-arrival risk assessment to focus on scenario-based indicators of travellers

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The ultimate goal is to identify potential threats to national security by screening travellers for admissibility under the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA)* and examining their personal effects for goods that may be undeclared, prohibited, controlled or regulated under the *Customs Act*, the *Customs Tariff* and/or unreported currency or monetary instruments under the *Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (PCMLTFA)*.

The CBSA collaborates with the relevant agencies to ensure that scenario-based indicators are continuously reviewed, monitored and updated to reflect the most current intelligence.

In addition to the application of scenario-based indicators, the NTC conducts specific flight targeting initiatives to identify persons of potential high-risk.

The CBSA participates with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and other federal agencies on the High Risk Traveller Case Management Initiative Working Group. Individuals ~~with suspected involvement~~ suspected to be involved in extremist activities abroad or affiliations to terrorist groups (example: Jubhat Nusrah (JN), Islamic State in Iraq and the Lenvant (ISIL), Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)) are reviewed from law enforcement, intelligence, and security perspectives.

## **Background:**

It has been estimated that over 11,000 individuals from over 70 countries have joined the conflict in Syria and Iraq. In Canada, an increasing number are contemplating, planning, financially supporting, and directly participating in foreign conflicts.

The CBSA is well-positioned to identify, detect, disrupt, and interdict foreign fighters and persons involved in violent extremism. CBSA actions include, but are not limited to the following:

- Issuing lookouts for CBSA interdiction on all known subjects of interest;
- Developing scenario-based targeting rules
- Identifying t and the RCMP potential foreign fighters who were previously unknown;
- Identifying potential associates, including persons of significant national security interest;
- Exchanging targeting intelligence with The Border Five countries (which includes the customs administrations of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States); and
- Participating in the RCMP-led High Risk Traveller Case Management Initiative, focused on the identification and investigation of foreign fighters, in partnership with Passport Canada, the Department of Justice, and the Communication Security Establishment.

Approved by: NamePaul Porrior/Acting Director General/Operations BranchTitle/Branch/phone-613-954-4491 all in Times  
New Roman size 9  
Date: XXX, XXSeptember 19, 2014



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## **CANADA BORDER SERVICES AGENCY** **NATIONAL TARGETING CENTRE** **FOREIGN FIGHTERS**

### **KEY MESSAGES:**

- The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) is targeting and interdicting potential foreign fighters.
- The CBSA and United States Customs and Border Protection (USCBP) continuously collaborate on the development of significant event management, and daily targeting centre subject queries.
- Identified persons of risk are examined for prohibited, restricted or controlled goods, as defined by the *Customs Act*, *Customs Tariff Act*, and *Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Finance Act*.
- The CBSA is proactively working with Public Safety partners, recognizing that each has a role in mitigating this threat.

### **Current Status:**

The CBSA National Targeting Centre (NTC) conducts pre-arrival risk assessments to focus on travellers. The ultimate goal is to identify potential threats to national security by screening travellers for admissibility under the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA)* and examining their personal effects for goods that may be undeclared, prohibited, controlled or regulated under the *Customs Act*, the *Customs Tariff* and/or unreported currency or monetary instruments under the *Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (PCMLTFA)*.

The CBSA collaborates to ensure that scenario-based indicators are continuously reviewed, monitored and updated to reflect the most current intelligence.

In addition to the application of scenario-based indicators, the NTC conducts specific flight targeting initiatives to identify persons of potential high risk.

The CBSA participates with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and other federal agencies on the High Risk Traveller Case Management Initiative Working Group.

Individuals suspected to be involved in extremist activities abroad or affiliations to terrorist groups (example: Jubhat Nusra (JN), Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)) are reviewed from law enforcement, intelligence, and security perspectives.

### **Speaking Points:**

It has been estimated that over 11,000 individuals from over 70 countries have joined the conflict in Syria and Iraq. In Canada, an increasing number are contemplating, planning, financially supporting, and directly participating in foreign conflicts.

The CBSA is well-positioned to identify, detect, disrupt, and interdict foreign fighters and persons involved in violent extremism. CBSA actions include, but are not limited to the following:

- Issuing lookouts for CBSA interdiction on all known subjects of interest;
- Developing scenario-based targeting rules
- Identifying potential foreign fighters who were previously unknown;
- Identifying potential associates, including persons and commercial entities of potential national security interest;
- Exchanging targeting intelligence with The Border Five countries (which include the customs administrations of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States); and
- Summer 2014, the CBSA participated in a joint B5 Foreign Fighter :  
Currently, the CBSA is working with USCBP to develop and implement a concept of operations focused on the operationalization of an ongoing Foreign Fighter initiative.
- Participating in the RCMP-led High Risk Traveller Case Management Initiative Working Group, focused on the identification and investigation of foreign fighters, in partnership with Passport Canada, the Department of Justice, and the Communication Security Establishment.
- Implementing, in partnership with Passport Canada and the RCMP, 1  
based targeting rules to identify travelers with suspended Canadian passports, Canadian passports under investigation for suspension and foreign passports of concern.

JUL 14 2014

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Director General/ Directeur général Calvin Christiansen Tel. /Tél. : 613-991-1773				
<p><b>Subject/Objet :</b> National Targeting Centre continued collaboration with the United States on registered sex offenders</p> <p><b>Action/Mesure :</b> For Information</p> <p><b>BF/AR :</b></p> <p>Please find attached a briefing note to provide an overview of the successful collaboration between the Canada Border Services Agency and United States partners, specifically Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, with respect to US-registered sex offenders travelling to or through Canada.</p>				

Canada Border Services Agency  
Operations Branch, V.P.'s Office

JUL 08 2014 19760

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JUL 14 2014



Canada Border  
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For information

## THE NATIONAL TARGETING CENTRE'S CONTINUED COLLABORATION WITH THE UNITED STATES ON REGISTERED SEX OFFENDERS

For the Minister

### PURPOSE

To provide an overview of the successful collaboration between the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and its United States (US) partners, specifically Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, with respect to US-registered sex offenders travelling to or through Canada.

### BACKGROUND

In co-operation with the CBP Advanced Targeting Team (ATT), the CBSA liaison officer (LO) at the CBP National Targeting Center-Passenger (NTC-P) has been receiving referrals of US-registered sex offenders travelling to or through Canada

the CBSA LO has been coordinating with CBSA regional intelligence and the CBSA liaison to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) National Child Exploitation Coordination Centre to provide notification of the arrival. Affected ports of entry have been coordinating the primary and secondary response for the arrivals.

### STATUS

This joint effort between the CBSA and its US partners has resulted in numerous enforcement actions by the CBSA. Between May 30, 2012, and June 26, 2014, there have been referrals by CBP ATT of sexual offenders travelling to Canada, resulting in 121 enforcement actions. The importance of this partnership may be demonstrated in part by a significant enforcement action and arrest by the CBSA following the referral of a US-registered child sexual offender. On July 30, 2013, the subject was travelling on a flight from Portland, Oregon, to Vancouver, British Columbia, with onward travel to Chennai, India, via Hong Kong. In 1997, the subject had been convicted of sexual battery, for which he was sentenced to eight years' incarceration. The victim of that crime was 14 years old. The subject was examined and reported as inadmissible under 36(1)(b) of the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* (IRPA). The subject withdrew his application to enter Canada and was issued an "allowed to leave." Upon examination of the subject's checked baggage, compact discs containing videos depicting child

Page 1 of 2

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pornography were found and seized under the *Customs Act*. The electronic media was turned over to the RCMP, along with the subject. The subject pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography and served a six-month sentence before being deported from Canada.

Other notable enforcement includes the seizure of a taser—a prohibited weapon.

On May 19, 2014, CBP provided information regarding the scheduled travel through Canada of a 57-year old male US-registered sexual offender. The subject was travelling on May 20, 2014, from Vietnam to Vancouver, with ongoing travel to Seattle, Washington. In 1989, the subject had been convicted of exploitation of a minor and had also been convicted of burglary. The subject was examined and reported as inadmissible under 36(1)(b) of IRPA. The subject withdrew his application to enter Canada and was issued an “allowed to leave.” A secondary examination resulted in a seizure under the *Customs Act* for the non-report of a prohibited weapon.

## NEXT STEPS

This operation has increased collaboration and consultation within the CBSA and with US partners and has resulted in more than 100 refusals by the CBSA of US sex offenders travelling to Canada. Response to the program by affected CBSA ports of entry has been extremely positive, and awareness of US sex offenders travelling to Canada has increased. It has further improved the profile of the CBSA LO position in the NTC-P and in the programs administered by the CBP. This initiative will continue to enhance collaboration with US partners and generate enforcement actions to protect the health and safety of Canada and its citizens.



JUL 14 2014

Luc Portelance  
President

14 JUL. 2014



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Pour information

## **PARTENARIAT ENTRE LE CENTRE NATIONAL DE CIBLAGE ET LES ÉTATS-UNIS EN CE QUI CONCERNE LES DÉLINQUANTS SEXUELS ENREGISTRÉS**

À l'intention du ministre

### **BUT**

La présente se veut un aperçu du partenariat fructueux entre l'Agence des services frontaliers du Canada (ASFC) et ses partenaires américains, plus particulièrement Customs and Border Protection (CBP) et Immigration and Customs Enforcement, en ce qui concerne les délinquants sexuels enregistrés aux États-Unis qui cherchent à entrer au pays ou à y transiter.

### **CONTEXTE**

Dans le cadre de sa coopération avec la Advanced Targeting Team (ATT) du CBP, l'agent de liaison de l'ASFC en poste au National Targeting Center-Passenger (NTC-P) du CBP reçoit des recommandations concernant des délinquants sexuels enregistrés aux États-Unis qui cherchent à entrer au Canada ou à y transiter

l'agent de liaison de l'ASFC collabore avec les équipes régionales du renseignement de l'ASFC et l'agent de liaison de l'ASFC posté au Centre national de coordination contre l'exploitation des enfants de la Gendarmerie royale du Canada (GRC) afin de transmettre un avis d'arrivée. Les points d'entrée concernés s'occupent des interventions primaires et secondaires à l'arrivée des délinquants sexuels.

### **ÉTAT**

Ce partenariat avec les homologues américains est à l'origine d'un nombre accru de mesures d'application de la loi comme en témoignent les 121 mesures d'exécution prises du 30 mai 2012 au 26 juin 2014 à la suite de renvois effectués par l'ATT du CBP. La prise d'une importante mesure d'exécution à l'encontre d'un agresseur sexuel d'enfants enregistré aux États-Unis et son appréhension à la suite d'un renvoi à l'ASFC témoigne de l'importance de ce partenariat.

Le 30 juillet 2013, l'individu condamné à purger une peine d'emprisonnement de huit ans pour violence sexuelle sur une victime âgée de 14 ans en 1997 est arrivé à Vancouver, en Colombie-Britannique, à bord d'un vol en partance de Portland, en Oregon, et devait ensuite se rendre à Chennai, en Inde, en passant par Hong Kong. L'individu a fait l'objet d'un contrôle et a été déclaré interdit de territoire en vertu de l'alinéa 36(1)b) de la *Loi sur l'immigration et la*

Page 1 de 2

Canada



PROTÉGÉ A

*protection des réfugiés* (LIPR). L'individu a retiré sa demande d'entrée au Canada et a reçu l'autorisation de quitter. La fouille des bagages enregistrés de l'individu a mené à la découverte de disques compacts contenant des vidéos de pornographie juvénile, lesquels ont été saisis en vertu de la *Loi sur les douanes*. Les disques compacts et l'individu ont été livrés à la GRC. L'individu a plaidé coupable à l'accusation de possession de pornographie juvénile et a purgé une peine d'emprisonnement de six mois avant d'être expulsé du Canada.

Il convient également de souligner la prise d'une autre importante mesure d'exécution qui a donné lieu à la saisie d'un pistolet Taser (arme prohibée). Le 19 mai 2014, CBP a informé l'ASFC des déplacements prévus d'un délinquant sexuel enregistré aux États-Unis âgé de 57 ans. Le 20 mai 2014, l'individu, reconnu coupable d'exploitation de mineurs et de cambriolage en 1989, est arrivé à Vancouver à bord d'un vol en partance du Vietnam et devait ensuite se rendre à Seattle, dans l'État de Washington. L'individu a fait l'objet d'un contrôle et a été déclaré interdit de territoire en vertu de l'alinéa 36(1)b) de la LIPR. L'individu a retiré sa demande d'entrée au Canada et a reçu l'autorisation de quitter. Un contrôle secondaire a mené à une saisie en vertu de la *Loi sur les douanes* pour omission d'avoir déclaré une arme prohibée.

## PROCHAINES ÉTAPES

Ce partenariat a augmenté la collaboration et la communication au sein de l'ASFC et a permis cette dernière d'interdire l'entrée au pays de 100 délinquants sexuels enregistrés aux États-Unis. Le programme suscite des commentaires favorables de la part des points d'entrées canadiens concernés et contribue à une plus grande vigilance à l'égard des délinquants sexuels enregistrés aux États-Unis. Il accentue l'importance du poste d'agent de liaison de l'ASFC au NTC-P et aide à l'amélioration des programmes administrés par CBP. De plus, ce partenariat contribuera au renforcement de notre collaboration avec nos partenaires américains et favorisera la prise de mesures d'exécution en vue d'assurer la santé et la sécurité du Canada et des Canadiens.



14 JUL. 2014

Luc Portelance  
Président



Canada Border  
Services Agency

Agence des services  
frontaliers du Canada

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Border Services



16(1)  
Services frontaliers  
16(2)

**National Targeting Centre  
High Risk Traveller Case Management Initiative  
Status Report: September 1-30, 2014**

**Purpose**

To provide an update on National Targeting Centre (NTC) activities related to identifying Syrian Foreign Fighters.

**Scenario Based Targeting (SBT) rule development**

The NTC is currently using scenarios developed by the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA)

scenarios relative to ongoing projects are currently under development.

In addition, there have been new scenarios developed pertaining to stolen passports, invalidated passports and passports of concern for national security.

**Significant Examinations/Highlights/Results**

**Targeting Information Disclosures**

The NTC Targeting Operations Intelligence (TOI) section information disclosure requests for targeted secondary examination results. This information was provided and tracked in accordance with section 107 4(h) of the *Customs Act*.

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This document is the property of the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and should not be reclassified or disseminated without prior consent of the originator. The information must be stored, transmitted, and safeguarded in accordance with its classification level, as outlined in the Government Security Policy and the CBSA Security Policies. If access is requested under the *Access to Information Act* or the *Privacy Act*, no decision should be taken without prior consultation with the originator, as the information may be subject to exemptions. Requests for additional use should be forwarded to the Intelligence Operations and Analysis Division.

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Border Services



Services frontaliers

## Targeting Projects

began on August 26, 2014 until October 31, 2014. Post project analysis and flight risk assessment will be complete by November 15, 2014. Project results will be shared with TO-I, TO-P, Prairie Region, Atlantic Region

## Travel Study

The NTC Geospatial Analysis Unit have worked on several travel studies to try and identify travel patterns. There are currently scenarios in place. There are currently scenarios being proposed. there

## High Risk Traveller Case Management Initiative

The TOI section attended one High Risk Traveller Case Management Initiative meeting in September. The meeting was held at the request of the RCMP.

The RCMP advised that the number of individuals of interest continues to grow. The list has been amended to reflect individuals according to their affiliated terrorism group (example: Jubhat Nusra (JN), Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)) and whether they are abroad or have intention to travel abroad.

The CBSA communications section is working with the RCMP on developing standard media lines. Passport Canada provided information on the procedures to invalidate or revoke passports.

During the meeting, the RCMP introduced the new chair of the HRT Committee; Paul Lynn who will be replacing Corey Langille. The RCMP also introduced new training opportunities with Sergeant Renu Dash entitled "Combatting Violent Extremism". Two sections within CBSA (NTC and EIOD) are working to acquire terrorism training to both HQ and regional employees.

All information gained from these meetings were used in the refinement and/or development of scenarios and were also used in shift briefings.

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**Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) National Targeting Centre (NTC)**  
**Liaison Officer Monthly Activity and Statistics Report**  
**January 2015**

PROTECTED "A"

Supporting Work Activities	Training (topic specific)						11		
	Other					1	9		

#### Requests for Information from RCMP to NTC (month and fiscal totals)

- January 2015: 1
- Fiscal Year 2014-2015: 7

#### Disclosure (month and fiscal totals)

A total of 0 RFI's were not actioned due to disclosure concerns. Broken down as follows:

- January 2015: 0
- Fiscal Year 2014-2015: 0

#### Information Shared by NTC with RCMP (month and fiscal totals)

- January 2015: 2
- Fiscal Year 2014-2015: 11

#### Requests for Information from NTC to RCMP Liaison during the Month of January 2015


- Request for database checks in support of narcotics importation x 2.
- Request for database checks in support of criminality x 11.
- Request for database checks in support of immigration x 1.

#### Other Activities for January 2015

- Building on the OMG initiative, 12 names of known OC associates were provided to the NTC by RCMP for analysis and in support of targeting operations. Awaiting analyses and subsequent disclosure request if applicable.
- Heroin initiative. Known heroin importers, exporters and business names provided to the NTC TO-I for analysis and in support of targeting operations. Awaiting analyses and subsequent disclosure request if required.
- Provided stolen Beninese Diplomatic and Service Passport information which consisted of a succession of passport numbers for CBSA awareness and appropriate organizational action.
- Attended RCMP National Security JOC – CBSA NTC, TOI-NS meeting on enhanced information sharing initiative. Positive outcome with RCMP NS-JOC providing specific information to the TOI-NS for analysis and hopeful subsequent investigational support on ongoing national security investigations.

Report prepared and submitted by:

Mike Cochrane  
Intelligence Officer  
NTC-RCMP Liaison



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For information

THE SYRIAN FOREIGN FIGHTER

For the President

PURPOSE

The purpose of this Briefing Note is to provide you with information on the results of the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) involvement in the Border Five (B5) Heads of Intelligence (HINT) Targeting Working Group (TWG) Syrian Foreign Fighter

BACKGROUND

In July 2014, the B5 HINT TWG agreed to collaborate on a Syrian foreign fighter. The objective was to develop a collective view of B5 targeting efforts in the context of the Syrian civil war to compare approaches and inform future operations.

STATUS

At the completion of the B5 HINT TWG exercise, the CBSA National Targeting Centre (NTC) Targeting Operations - Intelligence (TO-I) section

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Several lessons have been learned for future initiatives, as follows:

1. Parameters and document type(s) of scenario-based targeting (SBT) rules to be exchanged must be defined.
2. SBT rules must be defined and documented.
3. SBT rules must be defined and documented.
4. SBT rules must be defined and documented.
5. What constitutes derogatory information and/or intelligence holdings, (i.e. lookout, target, previous target, customs enforcement action, immigration enforcement action, previous passage history, etc.) must be defined and documented
6. The requirement to obtain written notification/confirmation of all record deletion from each B5 partner at the conclusion of the project on September 16, 2014 must be established.
- 7.

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NEXT STEPS

The B5 HINT TWG drafted a concept of operations in Ottawa on September 11, 2014, for within two weeks. During this time, B5 scenario-based-targeting rule development teams will review B5 foreign fighter scenario-based rules to determine whether the rule set will be refined or expanded.


Comment [SL2]: That will be implemented in two weeks? I don't understand what this is saying.

Martin Bolduc, Vice-President  
Operations Branch

ATTACHMENT

- 1. Border5 Heads of Intelligence (HINT) Syria Foreign Fighter





Canada Border Services Agency  
Agence des services frontaliers du Canada

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For information

## THE SYRIAN FOREIGN FIGHTER .

For the President

### PURPOSE

The purpose of this Briefing Note is to provide you with information on the results of the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) involvement in the Border Five (B5) Heads of Intelligence (HINT), Targeting Working Group (TWG) Syrian Foreign Fighter

### BACKGROUND

In July 2014, the B5 HINT TWG participants agreed to collaborate on a Syrian Foreign Fighter

The objective of this exercise was to draw together a collective view of B5 targeting efforts in the context of the Syrian Civil War and use this information to compare approaches and inform future operations.

### STATUS

At the completion of the B5 HINT TWG exercise the CBSA Targeting Operations-Intelligence (TO-I) developed the attached analytical product which identifies trends, best practices and lessons learned for future initiatives. They consist of the following:

Valuable lessons learned for future initiatives:

1. Define parameters and document type(s) of scenario based targeting (SBT) rules to be exchanged.
2. Define specific Advanced Passenger Information (API) and Passenger Name Record (PNR) elements to be exchanged. ' , however other PNR information needs to be specified.

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5. Define and document what constitutes derogatory information and/or intelligence holdings, i.e. lookout, target, previous target, customs enforcement action, immigration enforcement action, previous passage history, etc.
6. Identify the requirement to obtain written notification/confirmation of **all** record deletion from each B5 partner at conclusion of project September 16, 2014.
7. 1

Reasons why ( is high - may include but not limited to:

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## NEXT STEPS

The B5 HINT TWG continues to participate in ongoing series of teleconferences in support of the HINT TWG recommendations.

and will be discussed in the next several weeks. Other B5 teleconferences will feature discussions on SBT rule performance methodologies to identify optimal measurement practices as well as trends and threats identified in the original exercise. A teleconference will take place in the next several weeks on targeting methodology. The US CBP will take the lead on organizing the call.

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Martin Bolduc, Vice-President  
Operations Branch

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THE SYRIAN FOREIGN FIGHTER

For the President

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**Comment [SL1]:** I've seen a couple of different names for ISIS...what are we using? (i.e. what does ISIS stand for?)

STATUS

At the completion of the B5 HINT TWG exercise, the CBSA National Targeting Centre (NTC) Targeting Operations - Intelligence (TO-I) section

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- 4.
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ATTACHMENT

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